

REGISTRY

*

FILE

Committee 1611

Also

Security 8

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-719

19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Proposed Community Response to HPSCI Report

1. I propose that you discuss with SECOM members at the 28 November 1979 meeting the idea of preparing a Community position paper to the DCI on the HPSCI Report "Security Clearance Procedures in the Intelligence Agencies."

2. Background: Aware of the interest that HPSCI hearings on clearance procedures generated in CIA, DIA, FBI and NSA, and of the contents of the HPSCI report, the Staff tasked the Investigative Standards Working Group to expedite completion of its study on investigative sources and to compile basic data on specific issues raised in the HPSCI report.

3. Staff Position: The HPSCI report is essentially a compendium of information from Community agencies with observations and recommendations by the HPSCI on Community procedures. If any response is called for it should reflect a uniform and agreed to Community position. This concides with views of departmental representatives on the Working Group. They would like to endorse for SECOM consideration a position which:

a. Recognizes that the Community's investigative procedures are undesirably diverse and supports development of common standards;

b. Agrees with the HPSCI observation that the short form investigative report used by DIS is inadequate and should be expanded.

c. Supports making TS and SCI investigations more similar (i.e., upping TS investigations as much as can be supported by the McCabe Study holding firmly to current DCID 1/14 standards).

d. Recognizes the need for common standards and better quality control for SCI investigations. They do not all agree on the idea of a new central investigative agency or service (although some departmental representatives speak of the benefits to be gained by having the DCI do all SCI investigations). They are united on considering a DCI sponsored training program for all investigators and adjudicators.

e. Suggests expansion of polygraph usage to all intelligence collecting agencies for SCI access. They look favorably on a minimum standard limiting the polygraph to CI coverage. They recognize that some agencies have broader uses which might need to be continued.

f. Agrees that something has got to be worked out so investigators can access information now being denied them, and so that the FBI could collect and provide information in cases of the type mentioned in the HPSCI report.

Working group members are drafting position statements and collecting data on dollar and manpower resource ramifications bearing on these issues. I do not expect the Working Group product to be anywhere near finished or to include all desirable details. I do think it will represent a good first step and provide opportunity for SECOM members to appreciate the significance and scope of the matter.

From a personal viewpoint, I believe that the HPSCI report offers a first rate opportunity for the SECOM to move toward an informed, conceptual (though perhaps not yet practical) resolution of long standing problems. It gives us opportunity again to focus management attention in connection with APEX on concerns about providing large volumes of formerly compartmented material to people "cleared" at the SECRET level.

An agreed SECOM paper along these lines would certainly foster the position of the DCI in connection with his Community role of providing uniform security procedures. It would enhance the SECOM role as the DCI's focal point for Community security affairs.

I rate this as one of the most significant Community security concerns that has arisen in all the years of the Security Committee.

4. Recommendation: That you inform the SECOM at its 28 November meeting that you:

a. Endorse Investigative Standards Working Group action in collecting relevant information on issues in the HPSCI report.

b. Solicit the support of SECOM Principals for such efforts.

c. Encourage members to participate on an open basis, surfacing problems or internal concerns for membership information and discussion, and not to develop rigid in-house positions tending to close out further deliberations.



STATIN

Attachment:
Chart

The SECOM's Investigative Standards Working Group has divided the task of collecting data bearing on the HPSCI report as follows:

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Action Element</u>	
1. Polygraph	CIA	STATI
2. Investigations - Standards and Single Agency concept	CIA State (McCabe) FBI (Doran) AF (O'Neil) Justice (Trombetta)	
3. SCI and TS	Army DIA	
4. DIS's lack of positive Reporting	Navy (Mary Evans) State (McCabe)	
5. Lack of Access to Police Records	State (McCabe)	
6. Inconsistencies between FBI Guides, E.O. 10450 and Privacy Act	CSG (Newman) State (McCabe)	

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, WIS.
BILL D. BURLISON, MO.
MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
LES SPIN, WIS.
CHARLES ROSE, N.C.
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
NORMAN Y. MINETA, CALIF.
WYCHE FOWLER, JR., GA.

J. KENNETH ROBINSON, VA.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO
ROBERT MCCLORY, ILL.
G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, VA.
C. W. BILL YOUNG, FLA.

THOMAS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

November 8, 1979

OS REGISTRY
*** FILE** *Committees 16A*
Also: Security 8


Mr. Robert Gambino
Director, Office of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gambino:

Attached is a preliminary draft of a bill the Committee is considering in the wake of the Oversight Subcommittee's recent hearings on Security Clearance Procedures. The report issued as a result of these hearings is also attached.

I would appreciate your personal comments on the draft and would ask you to respond by December 10, 1979.

Sincerely,


Michael J. O'Neil
Chief Counsel

Attachments


OS 9 2826

STAT

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4



30 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

STATINTL FROM:
Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: 26 October 1979 Meeting with Tom Latimer,
Staff Director, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence

STATINTL 1. Along with of OLC, I met with Tom Latimer on 26 October 1979 in the latter's conference room. The meeting, also attended by Betsy Keyes of Tom's office, lasted about thirty minutes. The topic was the requirement stated in Chairman Boland's 18 October 1979 letter to the Director urging the DCI to "conduct a study to validate the accuracy of the polygraph in the pre-employment setting and to establish some level of confidence in the use of that technique."

2. Latimer made these points to help explain the Committee's objective:

a. The Agency had obviously benefited enormously over the years (thirty plus) by its use of the polygraph as a security screening device.

b. Despite the Agency's assertions of the value of polygraph, other intelligence agencies have held off on its use sometimes claiming that the technique lacks reliability or validity or both.

c. The HPSCI seeks a more even-handed and rational approach to the use of the polygraph throughout the Intelligence Community but feels stymied for lack of material to counter the criticisms, i.e., not reliable, not valid, etc., coming from the detractors.

d. The HPSCI is looking for as much persuasive material as can be found within the Agency and outside to bolster the case scientifically that the technique is reliable, i.e., consistent; is valid, i.e., detects deception; and is effective in a total security screening effort because it develops significant and relevant information not otherwise readily available.

e. The HPSCI does not expect the DCI now to launch a new piece of original scientific research on the polygraph technique even though such additional research might be needed or could be useful.

3. The writer assured Latimer that we could produce a document by the 1 December 1979 deadline which would:

a. Comprehensively report on the Agency's history in using the polygraph.

b. Identify precisely the requirements for a successful polygraph operation.

c. Provide the Agency statistics available to support the case for polygraph reliability, polygraph validity and polygraph efficacy.

d. Attach or at least reference Agency internal or external research efforts which shed light on the dynamics of polygraph in the security screening context.

4. As the meeting broke, Tom Latimer seemed satisfied that a product such as described above would serve the purpose HPSCI has in mind.

STATINT

STATINTL

cc: ✓DDCI (attn: [redacted])

SA/DCI/CI

STATINTL

OLC (attn: [redacted])

A/DDA

C/CI/DDO

STATINT

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100080004-4